In this paper, we examine a causal relationship between ‡attening of a government hierarchy and economic performance. Exploiting a novel panel dataset on government reorganization in China from 1999 to 2012, we …nd that delayering has led to increases in revenue and inter-govermental transfers for county governments. However, the associated enlarged span of control of the upper-level governments, has led to a reduction in county governments'total public expediture and pro-growth expenditure. Overall, the ‡attening of the government hierarchy has a negative e¤ect on economic performance.
Introduction
In an organization, the design of hierarchies deeply in ‡uences the information ‡ow, agents' incentives, and ultimately performance. Among all relevant attributes, the organization's depth-the number of vertical layers-and the width-the spans of control are attracting markedly increased attention. Organization structure involves a trade-o¤ between horizontal coordination and vertical control (Mookherjee, 2006) . While considerable progress has been made in empirically understanding corporate hierarchies (Rajan and Wulf, 2006) , much less is known about hierarchies and performance in public organizations. An important question remains unanswered: whether or not results based on …rms can be reliably generalized to public organizations.
In this paper, we provide quantitative evidence on how a government's productivity measured by per capita GDP varies with the number of vertical layers in its hierarchy. Government bureaucracy is a hierarchical organization with o¢ cial functions and well-established formal rules. It plays an important role in providing public goods and facilitating economic growth (Weber, 1947) . This study exploits a quasi-natural experiment-China's province managing county (PMC) reforms since 2003. After the reform, a provincial government could by-pass the prefecture level and directly administer county governments on …scal matters in the way it manages prefecture-level governments. In the period considered, there were rich spatial variations in the timing of the adoption of the PMC system, constituting a unique laboratory for studying the e¤ect of delayering on the outcomes of interest. To the best of our knowledge, this has been the …rst attempt to establish empirically a connection between government organization and economic performance.
Our analysis proceeds in three stages. We …rst investigate the link between the PMC reform and a county's economic performance. Speci…cally, do PMC counties experience higher or lower per capita GDP over time? Second, we shed light on the mechanism underlying the e¤ects. Do the ‡attening improve a county's …scal revenue and inter-govermental transfers-the goals of the reform? How does increased span of control impact the upper level government's ability to monitor expenditure? Third, we examine how the PMC reform a¤ects other economic outcomes such as household income, consumption, and inequality.
The analysis involves constructing a novel data set from a large number of o¢ cial sources. The data cover 1,809 counties between 1999 and 2012. They contain very detailed information not only about GDP, …scal revenue, transfers and expenditure, but also about changes in government's organization. Such comprehensive panel data allows for an examination of China's county economies before and after the PMC reform.
The key challenge in identifying the e¤ect of PMC reforms is selecting appropriate control groups for the treatment group. The validity of the standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DD) strategy and the causal interpretation given to the results relies on the assumption that non-PMC counties and counties which adopted PMC later are valid counterfactuals for what would have happened to earlier adopters in the absence of the PMC reform. However, the reformed counties are not randomly selected. To address the identi…cation challenge, we control for di¤erential trends in outcomes between PMC counties and non-PMC counties depending on the key determinants in the selection of PMC counties, a strategy used by Gentzkow (2006) . Beyond that, we restrict the sample to the PMC counties, increasing con…dence in the comparability of treated and control groups. Finally, we conduct a placebo test by randomly assigning the adoption of PMC reforms to counties. The analysis yields several main …ndings. First, the adoption of PMC reforms reduces a county's GDP per capita by an average of 2.6 percent, which translates into a 0.33 percent drop in the annual growth rate.
Second, the counties' …scal revenue and transfer tend to increase after the elimination of the intermediate layer of city governments in …scal management. However, the enlarged span of control for the provincial government has weakened its monitoring capacity on the spending side. In particular, both total public expenditure and pro-growth investment in PMC counties have declined after the reform. This, in turn, tends to negatively in ‡uence economic performance.
Third, using alternative measures of performance, no signi…cant e¤ects on household income or income inequality are evident. A negative and signi…cant e¤ect on consumption suggests that PMC reform does not generate an increase in social welfare.
This paper …ts into a large existing literature on organizational forms. An important line of research has looked at hierarchical organization processes by boundedly-rational members of an administrative sta¤ (Garicano and Van Zandt, 2013) . In a horizontal hierarchy, information ‡ows smoothly across vertical layers of administrations, resulting in fast execution (Patacconi, 2009 ). This, however, calls for intensive information processing, communication and coordination by the top hierarchy (Williamson, 1975) . There are limits to communication and to the cognitive abilities of upper level managers. A broad span of control will be demographically heterogeneous and large groups may create coordination and communication problems (Bandiera, Prat, Sadun and Wulf, 2014) . While this prior research mainly focuses on theoretical models, the empirical evidence of this paper can help forge links between theory and data. Speci…cally, our …ndings con…rm the theoretical logic that while ‡attening is expected to decrease delay, the increased span of control could cause distortions.
There has also been a broad strand of theoretical work that focuses on the role of incentives in hierarchies (Mookherjee, 2013; Besley and Ghatak, 2005 ). Rajan and Zingales (2001) develops a theoretical framework to study the incentive problems resulting from different shaped organizations. The main incentive problem in a vertical hierarchy is expropriability from upper-level managers. However, managers have an incentive to specialize due to their positional power. In a horizontal hierarchy, expropriability is dealt with, but this gives managers very little positional power, and therefore little incentive to specialize. The empirical …ndings of this study linking hierachial change to organizational performance are consistent with that theory, predicting that both expropriability and specialization would decrease after ‡attening.
This study also complements a number of works on China's government organization. Several studies have conducted economic system analyses comparing China's multi-divisional form structure to the unitary form structure of the Former Soviet Union. Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000) examine how organizational forms a¤ect the quality of incentive schemes that can be o¤ered to managers, and the resulting economic performance. In a similar vein, Gerard, Qian, and Xu (2006) focuses on coordination problems in conducting experiments associated with organizational forms. In contrast, this study exploits possibly exogenous within-country variations to examine delayering and county economies.
Lastly, our paper relates to a set of studies empirically testing the e¤ects of changes in information technology, competition on the product market or openness to trade on the internal structure of …rms including Acemoglu et al (2007) , Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) , Bresnahan, Brynjolfssohn and Hitt (2002), Caroli and van Reenen (2001) , and Rajan and Wulf (2006) . Most of that work examines the causes of organizational changes rather than the consequences, which is the focus of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the PMC reform background. Section 3 describes the identi…cation strategies and data in detail. Section 4 presents our main empirical …ndings, followed by the mechanism underlying the PMC e¤ects. Section 5 concludes.
China' s Administrative Structure and PMC Reform
China's administrative structure is among the most remarkable of human institutions. Its record of longevity and adaption to racially changed situations with minor disruption of its basic structure is unmatched by that of any other government system (Fitzgerald, 2002) . There have been variations in local administrative hierarchies under di¤erent dynasties, but counties have remained as China's most stable administrative units (Lin et al., 2013; Xu, 2011 ). An important issue in county governance is then which administrative level should lead the counties.
Since 1949, China's hierarchical system of administration has been highly centralized. Provinces have bene…ted from a central policy of horizontal-area coordination that devolved signi…cant powers to them (Fitzgerald, 2002) . And counties were tasked with almost all the functions and responsibilities of the provincial level. "Between these two spheres of real power. . . there was much administration but little authority" (Shue, 1994) .
From the late 1970s, there have been signi…cant changes in the way that China is governed, and these have been most pronounced at the local level. An important reform of China's administrative system since the early 1980s has been reshaping and reorganizing the prefectures, formerly the local organ of the provincial administration, as prefecture-level cities. This has gradually formed an additional formal layer in China's sub-national administration under the nationwide policy of "city managing county" (CPC). With this system, higher-level governments have much discretion in determining the …scal arrangement of the levels immediately below them. Provincial governments directly deal with city (prefecture) governments; city (prefecture) governments deal with county governments. There is no direct relationship, however, between provincial and county governments (Lou and Wang, 2008) . Figure 1 shows the adminstrative structure under the CPC policy. The average number of subordinates (prefectures) under a provincial government is 12, while the average number of subordinates (counties) under a prefecture government is 8.
[Insert Figure 1 Here] While relaying the mandates from above to their subordinate organizations, governments in each tier also add their own, leading to a cascade e¤ect so that the …nal burden on the county government can become very onerous (World Bank, 2002) . For example, under the CPC system a prefecture-level city commonly tends to favour its city proper at the expense of its subordinate counties (Ma, 2005) . The counties in poor regions have been harmed particularly severely because of this built-in bias in development strategy (Lam, 2009) .
Since the 2000s, the merits of the "province-managing-county" system have been hotly debated. Under PMC, a provincial government directly (and separately) manages cities (prefectures) and counties. The …scal relationship between the prefecture and the county has been removed (Lou and Wang, 2008) . By ‡attening the governance hierarchies, this scheme aims to relieve …nancial strain on county-level governments, improve the administrative e¢ ciency, and stimulate local economic growth. The PMC policies include:
1. A re-classi…cation of …scal revenue among province-level, prefecture-level and countylevel governments. In principle, a prefectural city is no longer entitled to share the revenue of the counties it formerly administered. The reform de…nes explicitly which taxes yield provincial exclusive revenues, county-level exclusive revenues, and shared revenues (including the county's sharing rate).
2. A reassignment of expenditure responsibilities among the di¤erent levels of government. A prefecture-level government does not bear responsibility for its formerly-administered counties'newly increased expenditure. More importantly, neither can the prefecture level government shift its expenditure responsibilities to counties.
3. An adjustment of the inter-governmental transfer system. The reformed provinces audit three major types of transfers-general purpose transfers, special-purpose transfers and rebates of tax (value-added tax, consumption tax and income tax)-across three layers of governments-provincial-level, prefecture-level and county-level. Based on the audits, the transfers formerly between prefectures and counties have been adjusted to now be between provincial and county governments. After the reform, provincial transfers and grants are allocated directly to counties instead of going through the prefecture-level governments.
4. Direct supervision and administration of counties by the province on …scal matters. The province manages counties'budget formulation, approval, implementation, audits and fund allocation. Figure 2 illustrates the new administrative structure under the PMC system. Zhejiang and Hainan were among the …rst provinces to adopt the PMC scheme province-wide in the 1980s. However, during the 1990s the PMC …scal reform was halted because rapid economic growth in some locales had allowed many counties to seek urban designations and "upgrades". Originally, promotion in the hierarchy represented a reward mechanism for local governments who achieved economic growth and did not violate national goals (Li, 2011) . Later, however, rampant "city fever"engendered masked urbanization and land use planning contrary to the provincial and national policy (Kung et al., 2011) . This …nally forced the state to dampen the feverish upgrading in the early 2000s. In addition to the PMC reforms, another noteworthy reform of China's adminstrative system since 2003 has been the county-power-expansion (CPE) reform, which aims to empower some county-level governments. Within the CPC system, CPE involves the devolution and delegation of powers and authority to county government (Liao, Li and Deng, 2013). However, speci…c CPE policies vary greatly among the reformed provinces. Some counties enjoy broad decentralization of …scal revenue and expenditure, land use, project approval and so on, while others have expanded their autonomy only within a limited range of regional matters.
This study focuses on the PMC …scal reforms because the PMC policies are more homogeneous among the reformed counties. All aim at ‡attening hierarchies in …scal administration. The standard approaches used in the reforms facilitate studying the underlying mechanisms without involving other confounding factors.
Estimation Strategy

Data
For the empirical analyses, we assemble a dataset describing socioeconomic conditions in each county in the years from 1999 to 2012. Speci…cally, we collect county-level information from various o¢ cial statistical publications and publicly-available databases.
County-level GDP, retail sales, rural household income and urban wage data are collected from the annual statistical yearbooks of the 25 Chinese provinces, supplemented by city-level statistical yearbooks or a county's statistical communiqué. To create a comprehensive and more importantly accurate county-level dataset, provincial statistical yearbooks are the main data source, since such data are the most consistent. In cases of data missing in that source, city-level statistical yearbooks or a county's statistical communiqué are used.
To address the county-level administrative changes during the sample period, the statistical consistency is ensured by tracking the records documented on the website of the Ministry of Civil A¤airs. 2 Counties with name changes are regarded as the same county if their administrative boundaries remain the same as in 1999. Those re-designated as urban districts from 1999 to 2012 are not included in the dataset.
The sample for empirical analysis thus consists of a panel of 1,809 county-level units over the 1999-2012 period. Detailed variable de…nitions and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Estimation Framework
To identify the e¤ect of the the ‡attening of hierarchies on economic performance, we use time and regional variations in the PMC reform in the mid-2000s. Speci…cally, the DD estimation involves comparing the performance of counties before and after the adoption of the PMC system with that of counties which had not yet adopted it during the same period. Figure 3 illustrates the validity of our identi…cation strategy. It shows the time trends of the logarithm of GDP per capita of the counties which adopted the PMC reform after 2004 and those which did not adopt the PMC reform during the sample period. The treatment group and the control group show similar trends before 2003, a year before the start of the PMC reform. But they diverge signi…cantly after 2003, when the growth in PMC counties lags behind that in non-PMC counties.
[Insert Figure 3 Here] Our baseline DD estimation has the following speci…cation:
where c and t indicate county and year, respectively; y ct represents a major outcome, such as the logarithm of GDP per capita; P M C ct indicates the county's PMC status with P M C ct = 1 if county c conducted the PMC reform in year t, and 0 otherwise; the c s are county …xed e¤ects, capturing all the time-invariant characteristics of the counties which might in ‡uence the outcome of interest; t s are year …xed e¤ects, controlling for nation-wide shocks in a particular year likely to have a¤ected all counties in a similar manner; and " ct is the error term. To address the potential serial correlation and heteroskadesticity, we cluster the standard errors at the county level.
Identifying Assumption and Checks
The identifying assumption underlying the DD estimation is that the PMC counties would have followed the same time trends as the non-PMC counties if they had not adopted the PMC reform. A primary threat to this identifying assumption is that the PMC counties were not randomly selected; so the divergence in Figure 3 after 2003 may have been caused by some pre-existing di¤erences between the PMC and non-PMC counties. To address this concern and improve the identi…cation, three approaches are applied. First, we follow an approach used by Gentzkow (2006) . Speci…cally, key determinants in the selection of PMC counties are identi…ed, and then di¤erential trends in outcomes between the PMC and non-PMC counties after the adoption of the PMC reforms caused by such determinants are controlled for. To this end, we look into the criteria the provinces used in selecting the PMC counties. For example, according to the central government's guidelines, those with a heavy …nancial burden, those with poverty county status, and with a large production of grain and cotton should in general be given priority to become pilot PMC counties. To reduce political and economic risk, in some provinces the PMC experiment was conducted in sparsely-populated and mountainous counties. Table A2 in the appendix lists in details the criteria used. Eight key selection criteria are identi…ed-county-level city, national poor county, major food-producing county, provincial boundary county, altitude, average slope, …scal gap, and urbanization rate. The detailed de…nitions are summarized in Table 1 . We include interaction terms between these selection variables S yielded and a third-order polynomial function of time in equation (2),
This ‡exibly controls for the evolution of outcome variables di¤ering between PMC and non-PMC counties depending on non-random selection. Second, the staggered adoption of the PMC system provides rich variations. The entire sample is used in the baseline analysis, which essentially compares early with later adopting counties as well as with non-PMC counties. In a robustness check, we focus on the PMC counties (52% of the full sample), which are assumed to be more homogenous. Hence, the identi…cation relies on comparing early adopting counties with later adopting ones (for another application of the same strategy, see Biderman, Mello, and Schneider, 2010).
Third, a placebo test is also conducted by randomly assigning the adoption of PMC reforms to counties. Table A1 shows that during the sample period, there are nine years in which PMC reforms took place. To preserve that fact while allowing for at least one year before and one year after the PMC adoption (as required by the DD method), eight years between 2000 and 2011 are selected at random and randomly assigned with the number of PMC adoption from the set f58; 113; 75; 15; 256; 201; 153; 87g shown in table A1. For each of the chosen years, we randomly designate counties as the treatment group without replacement. Using this false PMC status variable, a placebo DD estimation is conducted. Given the random data generation process, the false PMC variable should have produced no signi…cant estimate with a magnitude close to zero; otherwise, it would indicate a misspeci…cation of the DD estimation. To increase the identi…cation power of this placebo test, it is repeated 500 times.
Empirical Findings
The baseline estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table 2 . They show a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the PMC reform on the logarithm of GDP per capita. This …nding implies that the ‡attening approach has retarded economic development in the a¤ected counties.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The results in column 2 include the interactions between the eight key selection variables and a third-order polynomial function of time, and treatment-speci…c linear time trends to control for the estimation bias caused by the non-random selection of PMC counties. The negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the PMC reform persists despite of a signi…cant drop in its estimated magnitude.
Using the estimates in column 2 to calculate the economic magnitude suggests that the adoption of PMC policies reduces GDP per capita by about 2.6 percent on average. Note that the PMC reform started in 2004 and the sample period is from 1999 to 2012. Hence the DD estimate captures the average treatment e¤ect over about eight years. In other words, the 2.6 percent drop in the GDP per capita caused by the adoption of PMC policies can be translated into about a 0.33 percent drop annually.
Robustness Checks
To address concerns about the identifying assumptions and to corroborate the previous …nding, we conduct a battery of robustness checks.
Sample of PMC Counties.-Given the staggered nature of the policy reform, we are able to focus only on the PMC counties and estimate the e¤ect of the PMC reforms by comparing early PMC adopters with later adopters. Those estimation results using only PMC counties are reported in column 3. It shows a similar e¤ect in terms of both statistical signi…cance and magnitude.
Randomly Generated PMC Status.-To further check to what extent the results are in‡uenced by some omitted variables, we randomly assign the PMC status to counties and conduct a regression using the speci…cation in column 2 of Table 2 . This random data generation and regression process are repeated 500 times. Figure 4 shows the distribution of estimates from the 500 runs along with the benchmark estimate, -0.026, from column 2 of Table 2 . The distribution of estimates from random assignments is clearly centered around zero and the standard deviation of the estimates is 0.010, suggesting that there is no e¤ect with the randomly-constructed PMC reform. Meanwhile, the benchmark estimate is beyond 95 percent of the 500 estimates (only 4 estimates are close to the benchmark). Combined, these observations suggest that the negative and signi…cant e¤ect of the PMC reform on economic performance is not driven by unobserved factors.
[Insert Figure 4 Here] Other Policy Reforms.-If other policy reforms occurred during the same period, the estimates may mistakenly capture the e¤ects of those confounding factors rather than the e¤ect of the PMC reform. As a matter of fact, another important policy reform-the CPE reform involving the devolution and delegation of powers and authority to county governmentstook place gradually over the sample period. To isolate the e¤ect of the PMC reform, a variable indicating whether a county government carried out the CPE reform is inserted as an additional control variable. As shown in column 4 of Table 2 , the ‡attening of government structure still has a signi…cant and negative e¤ect on economic performance.
Misreporting and Luminosity Data.-Any misreporting of GDP …gures by local government o¢ cials would in ‡uence the results. If such reporting errors (or manipulations) changed systematically after the adoption of the PMC system, the estimates may simply re ‡ect new incentives in GDP reporting. To address that possibility, we use the luminosity data obtained from the American defense meteorological satellite program. The estimation results are reported in column 5 of Table 2 . Very similar results are obtained with the light per capita as an alternative performance measure.
Interpretation
Our aforementioned analyses robustly document a negative link between the PMC system and economic performance. Do they imply that China's implementation of the ‡attening strategy is ‡awed? Or does ‡attening government fail to improve economic performance because the increased span of control for the provincial governments leads to communication and coordination di¢ culties?
To shed lights on the mechanisms underlying our aforementioned …ndings, in this section we …rst investigate whether the PMC reform achieves its …rst-order goal by improving county governments'…scal situations. Then, we proceed to examine whether the expanded span of control for upper-level governments after ‡attening leads to a decrease in local economic development.
Fiscal Situations (transfers and revenue).-The PMC reform essentially transfered the direct administration of county governments on …scal matters from city governments to provincial governments. After the reform, provincial transfers (including general purpose transfers, special purpose tranfers and tax rebates) go directly from the provinces to the counties, and the provincial governments manage the counties in budget formulation, approval, implementation, audits and funds allocation. While ‡attening the hierarchies presumably improves the transmission e¢ ciency, it may have greatly increased the need for communication and coordination by the provincial governments. If the provincial governments are unable to act as better administrators than the preferecture governments have been, the reform may indeed have reduced administration e¢ ciency and worsened the county governments'…scal situations, which may …nally have led to a deterioration in economic performance.
To test such hypotheses, we examine each of the inter-government transfers and the county governments' total …scal revenue. First, the data limitation makes it impossible to separate general purpose transfers from speci…c purpose transfers, so whether the PMC reform increases or decreases total budgetary transfers received by county governments is examined. The estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table 3 . We …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the PMC reform on the per capita budgetary transfers. It suggests that ‡attening the administration improves the e¢ ciency of distributing intergovernmental transfers.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Whether county governments receive more tax rebates after the PMC reform is also tested. The estimation results are reported in column 2. The positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of the P M C term suggests that the reform increases the tax rebates received by county governments.
Whether the overall …scal revenue at the county level improves or not is tested by the estimation results reported in column 3. Consistent with other …ndings, the reform increases the total …scal revenue of the PMC counties.
County governments have been increasingly relying on the revenues from land transactions to …ll the …scal gaps, a phenomenon referred to as land …nancing. Column 4 shows that per capita land revenue decreased after the PMC reform, implying a reduction in land …nancing.
Taken together, these results indicate that the county governments'…scal situations improved after the PMC reform. The reform achieved its policy goals. These …ndings corroborate those of Rajan and Zingales (2001) , which …nd that a vertical hierarchy su¤ers from organizational diseconomies of scale due to loss of across vertical layers; and of Cremer, Garicano, and Prat, (2007), which show that vertical hierachies increase delay because communication involves more steps. Expropriability and delay on …scal matters are apparently reduced in the PMC counties after the ‡attening. Regressing Span ct on P M C ct with the same controls as in equation (2) veri…es whether the span of control increased in PMC counties after the adoption of the PMC reforms, i.e.,
Span of Control (spending)
The regression results are reported in column 1 of Table 4 . We …nd a positive and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient for the P M C ct term, supporting the argument that the PMC reform expands the span of control of the county governments'supervising bodies.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
To investigate whether the changes in the span of control signi…cantly in ‡uences economic performance, we include Span ct as an additional control in the baseline DD speci…cation (2) . If the inclusion of Span ct leads to a substantial decrease in the coe¢ cient of P M C ct , this would imply that the span of control represents an important channel (for other examples of the same approach see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; Maccini and Yang, 2009). The regression results are reported in column 2. With Span ct included the coe¢ cient of P M C ct is no longer signi…cant and the magnitude drops from 0:026 to 0:007. This suggests that the PMC reform substantially increases the span of control of the county governments'supervising bodies, which in turn negatively a¤ects the county governments' economic performance.
To further shed light on how the increase in the span of control a¤ects economic performance, we examine the composition in terms of spending components of the county governments. Each county'total public …nance investment is decomposed into productive investment-expenditure for capital construction, expenditures supporting rural production and agricultural spending on agriculture, forestry, water managment and meteorology-and other investment. 4 Regression results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 . After the reform, PMC counties reduce both their total public investment and their pro-growth investment; the magnitudes are economically meaningful albeit marginally insigni…cant (p-values are around 0.11).
Summary.-These results show that the ‡attening reform achieves its …rst-order goal. That is, the counties'revenue improved after the adoption of the PMC policies, due to the elimination of the intermediate city government layer. However, the increase in the span of control involved may have reduced the monitoring of county governments'spending, which had a negative e¤ect on economic performance.
Other Outcomes
The PMC reform had a negative e¤ect on per capita GDP. But did it a¤ect other aspects of the county economy in a similar manner? In this subsection, we examine its e¤ect on household income, consumption, and inequality.
[Insert Table 5 Here] Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 relates the PMC reform with average rural household income and the average urban household wage. Both outcomes are measured in 10,000 Chinese currency and in the log form for ease of the interpretation of the magnitude. PMC status shows no signi…cant e¤ect on either rural household income or urban wage. These results imply that neither rural nor urban residents bene…t directly from the ‡attening of the government hierarchy.
Column 3 intends to study the e¤ect of the PMC reform on household consumption. But due to the lack of household-level data, the logarithm of retailing sales per capita is used as a proxy. The negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of the P M C ct term suggests that counties adopting PMC policies witness a decline in consumption.
As for income inequality, without longitudinal household-level surveys in the sample period, income inequality can not be quanti…ed directly. Instead, we exploit the luminosity data and calculate the standard deviation of light emission of all cells within a county boundary as a proxy for county income inequality. The regression results are reported in column 4. No statistically signi…cant e¤ect of the PMC reform is evident, indicating that the ‡attening reform did not in ‡uence income inequality signi…cantly.
These alternative ways of measuring performance at the county level give results consistent with the previous …ndings, which show a negative e¤ect of the PMC reform on per capita GDP. Due to the utilisation pattern of expenditure by the county governments, the increased revenue and transfers do not generate an increase in social welfare.
Conclusion
In this paper we exploit a natural experiment to exaimine the e¤ect of government ‡attening on organizational performance. The results suggest that a more horizontal government organization decreased delay and expropriation in …scal transfers and revenue. But the increased span of control makes it di¢ cult for the upper level government to monitor local governments'spending. As a result, county economic performance measured by per capita GDP is negatively a¤ected by such reforms.
Our analysis demonstrates the trade-o¤ between a horizontal hierachy and a vertical hierachy. The optimal organizational shape crucially depends on the resulting coordination and control. When the bene…ts of reducing vertical control losses outweigh the costs of coordination, a horizontal hierachy will outperform a vertical hierachy. By contrast, a vertical hierachy is better if coordination problems are more prevalent.
This study could be a useful …rst step towards better understanding goverment organizational forms in developing countries. Much remains to be done. A deeper analysis of political economy within organizations is an exciting avenue for future research. Detailed data on the interaction between upper and lower levels of government, such as on the information of time use, would help enrich the micro-foundations of interactions associated with di¤erent organizational forms (Bandiera, Prat, Sadun and Wulf, 2014 
. Distribution of Estimated Coefficients in the Falsification Test
Note: The figure shows the cumulative distribution density of the estimated coefficients from 500 simulations randomly assigning PMC status to counties. The vertical line presents the result of column 2 in Table 2 . Note : *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the county-year level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by county. The PMC dummy variable is equal to one if an observation is after the PMC reform starts and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns 1 -4 is the natural log of GDP per capita. The dependent variable in column 5 is the natural log of light emissions at night per capita. Column 1 only additionally controls for county and year fixed effects. In column 2 onwards, the following control variables are controlled for: the interactions between the eight key selection variables and a third-order polynomial function of time, and treatmentspeci fic linear time trends. In column 3 the sample is based on PMC counties (52% of the full sample) excluding non-PMC counties. Column 4 additionally controls for the CPE Log(Light_ PerCapita ) Log(GDP_PerCapita ) Dependent variable Note : *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the countyyear level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by county. The PMC dummy variable is equal to one if an observation is after the PMC reform starts and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are the natural log of the measure of per capita fiscal transfer, tax rebates, fiscal revenue and land sales. All specifications control for county and year fixed effects, the interactions between the eight key selection variables and a third-order polynomial function of time, and treatment-speci fic linear time trends.
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Log(TaxRebate_P erCapita ) Note : *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the countyyear level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by county. The PMC dummy variable is equal to one if an observation is after the PMC reform starts and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are the natural log of the span of control, per capita GDP, fiscal expenditure and pro-growth investment. Pro-growth investment is a subset of fiscal expenditure and includes expenditure for capital construction, expenditures supporting rural production and agricultural spending on agriculture, forestry, water managment and meteorology . All specifications control for county and year fixed effects, the interactions between the eight key selection variables and a third-order polynomial function of time, and treatment-speci fic linear time trends.
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Log(ProGrowthInvest_Pe rCapita ) Note : *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All observations are at the county-year level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by county. The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are the natural log of rural income, urban wage, retail sales per capita and standard deviation of light emissions at night of all cells within a county boundary. All specifications control for county and year fixed effects, the interactions between the eight key selection variables and a third-order polynomial function of time, and treatment-speci fic linear time trends
